Active Advantage 2026: Playing The Bigger Game

Carol Geremia
Thank you so much. I am so delighted to be here and to finish up my career in this part of the world. I can't tell you how honored I am and delighted that I'm also not sitting looking at four feet of snow. which is outside my window at home from what I understand. So I'm really glad to be here.

I also know that there are many familiar faces. And so all the years that I have traveled here and really had some of the most healthy and stimulating and intellectual conversations about the future have been right here in Australia. And so you know that I have spent quite a bit of time talking about playing the bigger game or the idea of time to align. But I can assure you that this conversation has been such an evolving, important conversation. I've been inspired by a number of speakers recently.

One that is a professor at Yale today, was a professor at Princeton. He's an economist. He's a historian. But he recently wrote a book that is a series of his essays talking about unintended consequences and how disasters happen. The name of the book is “Why Did the Hindenburg Have a Smoking Lounge?” And what the basis of really his talks, he has a great TED talk that's out promoting the book, but what he really is focused on is the fact that we don't use lessons learned in history enough. But he also says what happens is we get very confident in our systems, we overreach, and then we go to the cycle of chaos, crisis, disasters. And they're constantly happening, and history really can show you how that plays out almost in very much a pattern.

But one of the things that the Hindenburg story is a fascinating one, not just the irony of what they had to do to put a smoking lounge in a vessel that was run on hydrogen, very inflammable. They had the choice to use helium. And they chose not to, which is not flammable, because it was too expensive. and it actually took up too much room, and it didn't allow for as much seating. And that was sort of the negative versions of his case studies, but he also had one that I didn't tell yesterday in Sydney, and I should have, was the case study on the Sydney Opera House. Where the budget, the plan, had gone over 1,500% in terms of overspend of the Sydney Opera House. But his definition of that was financial disaster, perhaps for the city, but really human ingenuity of an absolute masterpiece in the world. And so that negative-positive.

The other connection he makes, which I think is why I'm telling you this story and it's worth reading him, is a bit of where we are today. It's this constant contradiction and conflict between being safe, so safety for many industries, for us it's risk management, its responsibility, and then the tension and that contradiction between investor demand and the pressure for what the marketplace wants. And I think we are at a lot of points that Josh teed up quickly on unintended consequences.

One of the things that he talks about, and this is a little bit ironic, and maybe it's why I liked reading his stuff, was we just celebrated 102 years, but our 100-year anniversary in 2024.

And what I really reflected and learned so much, which I knew a lot about, but not as much as I found out in our anniversary, was really the lessons learned over that 100-year period. And the fact that there was just constant chaos all the time, whether it was technological advancement and unintended consequences coming out of that, or massive progress that we all had to adapt to and catch up on. And here's MIT. We invented the mutual fund, human ingenuity of democratizing investing, in 1924. It was really giving access to the small investor. to have access to the markets. And you could argue today, 102 years later, at least in the United States, is the mutual fund still fit for purpose?

But the way it's being used, is it really something that in the future will be fit for purpose? So this idea that lessons in history teach us a lot, and we shouldn't ignore that.

I think some of the lessons that I have been pounded into my head, being an employee at MFS for 42 years, is that these lessons learned, I think, still hold true today. The fundamentals matter. Knowing what we own with other people's money, deeply understanding what we own with other people's money, still matters.

The power of time, which we'll talk about, is still critically important in terms of managing risk. Diversification works. The opportunity, not just highest return at any cost, but the balance between risk and return. Disruption is constant. And the idea of teams over individuals, the idea that collective intelligence time and time again works, and we can't underestimate how much it reduces error and risk.

So I would say, and I think most of you would agree with me in this room, however, the world that we live in and the technological advancements we have coming pressured on us, or the uncertainty we live in because of external things, a lot of this stuff has gotten dumbed down. It becomes less and less important. We believe that there's other things that we should be focused on versus some of the simple core lessons learned.

And that's why I would say that history isn't everything. The reason this idea of playing this bigger game idea, which we are doing quite a bit inside MFS, is to realize the most important thing in the future is our ability to adapt to change.

What did Darwin say? It's not just the strength and it's not just the intellect. It's who survives are the ones that actually can adapt to the change that you're faced with in different environments. The beauty of playing the bigger game is you can't play alone. And we don't think we can play alone just as MFS. We know we don't have all the answers for the future. And that's why having the conversation, having a conference like this with clients, with people in the industry about leaving our agendas at the door for a moment and really thinking about how do we come out of our comfort zones. And by the way, those comfort zones have served us so well up to this point.

But can we come out of those comfort zones of the systems? And should we and are we obligated to really challenge the status quo? Because the gulp box, there are nine boxes and they each sort of have a story. But the gulp box is about the fear. And I would say the amount of pressure that our industry ends up being on, all the way down to the public and private companies we own, that the gulp is the fear of being fired. The career risk, the pressure of getting it right or getting it wrong.

And then the last box, which I think is really important and it always, always brings us back to the core, is our ability to truly sustain the ability of being great stewards with other people's capital. So I think the challenge to all of us is to challenge the status quo and make sure we're learning from the past. The last sentence that Edward Tenor, by the way, is the professor's name, he said his final comment on the Ted Talk was, “chaos will happen. Let's use it better.”

So who should play? The reason I really suggest time and time again, and we are playing with so many people in the industry on this conversation, including academics and very much including regulators. But who should play in having this bigger conversation to get to bigger, bold action and change is us in the middle, between who we serve, the end investor, and the public company or the private companies we own. Because I think the pressure and the influence that we have on the corporations, the public entities wanting a certain result, we sometimes underestimate how powerful our influence of allocating capital to them needs to be held at a whole nother higher order.

The other thing that's interesting, and I look at it and I'm still amazed because when I started in 1984, I can tell you that the world was not overseen by so much institutional money management.

And in 1975, 65% of the public markets was owned by individual investors. It was so natural for an individual investor to own Coca-Cola or General Motors or something like that as part of their risk-taking financial plan. And today, it's less than 5% today. 95% is all of us really allocating capital on behalf of other people. And so not only the obligation is huge, but what we've done is put in a very intense system of measurement and micro-measurement which we have to, you can't manage weight, you can't measure. But we have a false sense of comfort that that measurement is serving us the way we need it going forward, and I would challenge that now, all day long.

One of the biggest issues is that time horizons have collapsed. in this process. You would have thought that actually time horizons might extend as risk and more risk is being taken. But the reality is we've gone from eight years of holding an average stock in the public markets to less than six months. And so it's short-termism for sure that we actually need to talk about, but it isn't necessarily, is it an unintended consequence of the system we live in today? We just need to look at the impact and the influence that we are having on the companies we own, and that we are very much responsible.

So the good news is I think we've done a very good job allocating risk very well by diversifying across different investment philosophies. And so the rise of passive, the decline to a certain extent of being traditional active, being kind of the only risk bucket of the past, the increase in illiquid investments. And then what I would say, by the way, is I think we're in an unintended consequences of each of these buckets that I'm gonna touch on. But the idea that we have had so much confusion around sustainability and ESG should still concern us. It's still a problem and we can't ignore it.

So the unintended consequence, I would say, in thinking about passive markets is what Josh teed up. Jack Bogle, who I admired tremendously, and he actually was in our office before he passed away, about 15 months before he passed away, and he had a message for us. And he said, “you know, if the public markets get to over 50%, we're gonna have a problem. We're gonna have governance issues, we're gonna have concentration issues, and I don't think it's a healthy environment.”

He also added the fact that he couldn't stand ETFs. And he said, “oh, I can't say that, I can't say that, because my marketing team's gonna be mad at me”. But what he said, he said, “ETFs are actually great products. He said, what scares me is how they're being used.”

And so Jack was warning that, again, the human ingenuity of passive investing was absolutely brilliant. And it has worked for many, many great reasons of liquidity and exposure and for investors. But it is about that unintended consequence and balance that we really need to think about. I think one of the best stories I've heard, and it was written in a paper written by Focus Capital on the long term. They've really actually done a tremendous benefit and job for the industry by collecting all of us. They are playing a bigger game with all of us, including public companies, to change the system and the narrative of short-termism. They want to go to war on short-termism. So they've had a lot of research. They're bringing a lot of us together to say, how do we do this differently? One of their recent papers, it was actually done last year, I use it because I think it just raises the discussion about actually what's happening to the influence of the companies we now own with other people's money.

So it's about the Coke story, and the title is “Most Coke Shareholders Don't Care About Coke”. And here are the statistics. 28% of Coke's investors are retail investors. They're on the Coke team. 6% are short-term hedge funds, trading the stock on the price pattern, but not thinking about Coke's long-term success or failures. They're hired to do just that. 25% are passive and own Pepsi, too. So weight's in the index. They're indifferent of who wins, Coke or Pepsi. 42% of active managers are either underweight or overweight, the benchmark. And then 50% of that number, so 21% of them, are underweight Coke and hope Pepsi beats Coke.

So the message in this paper is the distortion of the management of these companies in terms of the alignment of their long-term strategy, if they have one, or the alignment of their business. And again, how to put best practices in place. The other paper that I thought was really, again, worth a read, came out in the end of 2025, was from the US National Bureau of Economic Research.

The paper says, all this suggests, it's about the rise of passive capital, all this suggests that if passive investments keep on growing, and it's hard to see why it wouldn't, then the whole process of investment becomes over time something distinct from seeking out, rewarding, and profiting from successful companies. Instead, it all becomes a circular bet on more money flowing into the asset class.

The growing body of evidence suggests stocks are insulated against surprises and less able to reflect fundamentals simply because of passive investment flows. This underlines the risk of faulty allocation of capital and alters the game in meaningful ways for passive and active investors alike.

The message here is not, again, passive is bad and the passive capital we have in our system, it is absolutely not. It's that we have grown into an unintended consequence. We need to think about managing well in the future.

The role of active management and the decline of the traditional active manager, and you're going to hear from Tim, who I think really hits hard on some of these issues, is that we have all said for a long time that our goal is to outperform over a full market cycle. Well, I can assure you, at least in my career the past 20 years, we have not at all talked about what a full market cycle is. But actually, if you had done the homework, historically, over the past 125 years, your average market cycle was between seven and nine years. More recently, since 1987, full market cycle is closer to 12.

But even those time periods are uncomfortably long for most investors today. And we've done global studies now for the past 10 years really getting the pulse, not only as what is your definition of a full market cycle, which actually keeps declining every time we do the survey. Believe it or not, people are defining that full market cycles are getting less, not longer, and it's actually the opposite. But the tolerance for underperformance of an active manager is now around three years. The industry has anchored the time horizons for active managers to perform on three and five.

And what I would say is measure us every day. It's not the point of measurement. It's not the point of not being measured against a benchmark. But I can assure you that that's about a third or less than half of the full market cycle. Those are markers to the longer-term destination of what you should be looking for us to do, ensuring that we're managing the risk and return criteria of the role of active management.

Here's what I worry about. Here's what Jack Bogle worried about. Here's what actually a lot of public companies are worried about. We have 2.4 million indices to compare products against, versus 43,000 public companies.

And I heard one of the greatest quotes from a pension, a CIO at a pension fund in Europe. And he said, “you know, what are we doing? What are we doing? We've gotten so good at moving money, moving capital, but we've lost our way in investing it.”

And this is just unintended consequence of having to reach for more return, having to take on more risk, micro-measuring to make sure we're holding things accountable. We have to do all of that, but we today have unintended consequences we need to ensure we look at deeply. Here's what happens with the active managers. We're all incentivized to go chase a benchmark. We're all marketing to chase a benchmark on three and five year periods of time.

And the academics have done the work. I can show you and inundate you with what happens here when we're hiring and firing active management at the wrong time. Every five year period, and I have done this for decades, by the way, that your top quartile managers, we're looking at past performance, actually 50% of the time the next five years are at the bottom half.

And I did this presentation for Lockheed Martin. They asked us to come in to talk on this topic, the war on short-termism, to their investment team. And he said, “I'm going to use this slide with my board, but you've got to tell me, you've got to have your people run the numbers on what happens to the bottom quartile for the same periods of time.” And I did. I had no idea what it was. I took the slide out because I don't have time, and I'll give it to anybody. But the same thing happened, the bottom quartile goes to the top half.

And I guess what all I'm saying is, it's about alignment. It's like what are we doing in terms of chasing past performance?

The Journal of Portfolio Management did calculate the hiring and firing effect to the end investor. It's costing them anywhere from 80 to 150 basis points of lost return a year because of the measurement system we have in place.

We have to measure, the message is not that. It's is there a better way to do this? Is there a bigger game we can all play to do this better?

Tim's gonna make some comments on private versus public. I just worry about this in the United States. As this thing is being shoved into the retail markets, I think at the end of the day, liquidity and transparency dominate everything. and we cannot forget about those important aspects. Just look at history, just go back to the GFC, and I think this idea that those things aren't gonna matter, they will, and when public markets get more pressure to be transparent and more liquid, because they've gone down into the retail segment, at least in the United States, they're gonna look a lot like the public markets. So is there a better pathway for us to work together? The last comment here is on ESG, and I just think that we've got to think about sustainability in a way that we really need to think about it as the systemic risk that we should look at in everything that we own.

I won't mention here, because I am running out of time, but this is worth reading. Leo Strine really challenged Milton Freeman's theory of shareholder primacy, the idea that corporations' purpose is to maximize profitability. And he said, “you know, I have the evidence all these years later, that isn't necessarily true.” And I think his point is, again, Milton Freeman's idea of shareholder primacy actually was probably pretty good, not only at the time, I just don't think Milton Freeman ever imagined we'd have this much passive capital owning companies, nor that we would be comparing ourselves against passive benchmarks to hold companies accountable. And so I think Leo Strine's comment is the stakeholder that everybody wins if profits are maximized aren't necessarily a true story today.

So bold action is happening. It is happening. I've been on this journey of conversation with so many competitors, people in the industry, academics, and truly, regulators. And State Street, I will give them the credit for inspiring me the most, about 15 years ago with their paper that nobody wanted to read or hear about. One was called the Folklore of Finance. The other was The Big Shift. And what they really said is we are starting to become misaligned with our purpose as an industry. And this is why we need to play a bigger game together. Our purpose is to drive economic prosperity by allocating capital well and responsibly, and to help investors achieve their financial outcomes.

I think we've done a really good job on the financial outcomes of our clients and our investors. I think we have forgotten about the power of what we're doing in terms of allocating capital into our system. And we're getting at peak points that would suggest we've got a lot of unintended consequences that need movement.

Here's Willis Towers Watson, their thinking ahead group is doing a tremendous amount of work on this in terms of new measurement models. Even the total portfolio approach, I think, is a great way to be thinking about how do we measure success in different ways versus just trying to beat the market in shorter and shorter periods of time. It's not necessarily, I think, the outcome for the future. Stewardship, performance, alpha against what, customization is coming, we've got technology, and I love the idea of portfolio value creation, which is really the hub of being started in Canada and some great work being done there. I'll finish with, bear with me, this is just a story that I think may have us want to play a bigger game even more.

My mom passed away last year. She had a great life. And the one thing about my mom that I talked about at her celebration for life is that she loved plants. She wasn't the greatest gardener, but she loved the botanical side of plants. And she loved pinecones.

She loved the resilience of pinecones, the sturdiness, the fortress, the vessel that pinecones were. And so my granddaughter and I, for her celebration, we collected hundreds of pine cones and had them in baskets at the back of the reception for people to take so they'd remember my mom.

But in this process, and the only reason I'm telling you this, I learned a lot about the pine cone. And I actually didn't know, but the pinecone, the conifer tree, is the oldest plant ever alive and living and still living. The pinecone is 300 million years old. And it's got an incredible system that actually protects the seeds. It opens and closes depending on the environment. The other thing I didn't know was that the pinecone in many cultures for thousands of years have represented, and our pineal gland is named after the pinecone. And many cultures around the world for a long time have said that our pineal gland is referred to as our third eye. It's our third eye. It's between thought and physical. Spiritual and physical. But it is the third eye of wisdom and judgment, and somewhat of our human power. And so when I think about what we can do together, truly, is think about that third eye. Get better as a group for the third eye, because it shouldn't be just man against machine, active against passive, private against public.

There's a better way to hold us all accountable for the things that you need us to do in the future. Active management needs to protect the public markets. I will leave you with one last thing that was said to me by a CIO of the largest pension fund in the world. And he said, “we need to care about active management.” I said, “thanks, but why?” And he said, “because we are the largest owner of passive product, and if you don't do what we need you to do as active manager from an engagement standpoint, from a governance standpoint from a concentration standpoint, we don't have a market.” So I say that, I will finish and thank you so much for listening and being here, and hopefully can answer some of your questions or comments.

Josh Barton
Thank you, Carol. You guys might have gathered she's quite passionate about this if you didn't pick that up. But Carol, appreciate the comments there. And guys, just a reminder, we do have Slido. So if you've got any questions, please send them through. We've got plenty of time for questions. And if anyone would like to ask a question, happy to open it up to the floor if anyone's willing to put their hand up.

Audience Member
That was excellent, Carol. Is anybody fighting against this performance test? I had to send out a letter to about 30 of my clients who hold the defensive fund in their portfolio, that at 9.34% was my best performing defensive fund out of all the actual defensive funds I hold in clients' portfolios. And we had to send out a letter because the test is wrong, not because the fund performed badly. And it just makes us feel like liars every year saying, because the previous year I had to send it out to about 40 or 50 people and they'd earned 16% on the particular fund, which was well above the typical balanced fund at that particular point in time. And the funds that are getting chosen, it's a small representation. I'm very much for active management. I run a portfolio of diversification and I put index in there so that I can show people where it fits in the whole scheme of things, but why they're paying for active management. Because I think it illustrates to them, we could have more of this, but we've got this because you're ending up with better returns. I just don't understand where people are getting their information from, and is there anybody taking up the cause?

Carol Geremia
Yeah, so I feel your pain, actually, in so many ways in terms of the regulatory requirements you're under and the pressure of testing. And what I would say is this is the time. If I were to look at MFS's history, which I have, and to see the times where we really needed to interact with the regulators, I would tell you now is the time. What we're finding in the United States with the SEC is that they want to talk. They know they've got systemic risk. They're not sure how they want to get at it, but they know they need us.

We met with them as an industry at the Board of Governors at the ICI meeting three weeks ago. We're sitting there talking to the new chairman of the SEC. He wants to hear from us in terms of public company reporting. How do we stop the short term nature of the pressure?

We have the highest turnover of CEOs in the United States right now. And again, are they managing companies well? I think they're probably trying, but they're also looking for the biggest pay packages in the shortest period of time because they know they'll be out. That's not the system I think our regulators want. But here's what happens.

We're talking to the FCA. They have come out with something I thought was fabulous called Value for Money. But the industry was a little annoyed by it because it just meant more reporting. I actually thought it was a huge opportunity for us to step into. But we shouldn't respond by saying value for money should just be about alpha over short periods of time and here's what your fee is. but we have a tendency to want to respond to that like that because we think that's what everybody wants to hear, and right now they do, but the reality is we have to blow this thing open to say you need to hold us accountable for committing capital longer than less than two years, which is the average holding of a stock in most equity portfolios today.

That we're not allocating capital for companies to be well run. So Leo Strine will go after us about this incentives, but they're all driving through the system. And so I guess to answer your question, we are. We need to do a lot more willing conversations with the regulators and not say to ourselves, we can't talk to them. Because I have never talked to regulators as much as I have in the past 36 months. And that includes the European regulator.

Even on the issues around sustainability, when they rolled out their entire regime and you had to pick whether you were Article 9 or 6 or whatever. You actually had a huge berth of how you were gonna define that.

And I think we need to challenge ourselves, challenge the status quo to not go back to what we're anchored to in terms of measuring success.

I think you're gonna get a lot better results out of active management if we really measure them with some new metrics, the average holding horizons, for an example. If you say you're long-term, prove it. It's a great statistic and it's really simple to use.

Josh Barton
Carol, there's a question in here with regards to Australian super funds, and it's quite a nice segue, I think, from your discussion around talking to regulators. But I guess the question's around how should Australians who operate within that super fund system and are very restricted by the benchmark regime that's imposed on them, what can we do about that?

Carol Geremia
The first thing I would do is get together as a group in some small or big way and it can't be based on commercial interest. And this is where I think when we go to talk to the regulators, sometimes as an industry we show up and we need to check our motive. It really needs to come back and say, how should you be holding active management accountable if you want us to allocate other people's money responsibly?

And there's enough evidence to really say that you did do the eight year time period, I don't know enough, but I'm gonna, eight year, which is actually better than most countries, anchoring on a little bit longer period of time. But maybe it would be really helpful to have a conversation about a full market cycle and why it's so important, not just the time horizon. Especially if that full market cycle continues to extend.

So it's sort of opening up a dialogue to say, one of the pieces of work that the Canadian system is working on is that portfolio value creation, which is to look more at measuring time horizons, measuring engagement, measuring proxy voting. Things that actually they need the active manager to do to ensure that the whole picture works. And the same goes, by the way, for the private markets.

Josh Barton
There's a great question here. I think it's a little bit of a challenge to your points here. But given the amount of disruption in the market, does that warrant a shorter time frame or a time horizon for investors so they can navigate that better?

Carol Geremia
Yeah, so I would say that if you go back in history, we've been sucked into that over and over again. And maybe I'm wrong. And I think artificial intelligence is going to help us tremendously think at different ways to not make it about time horizons.

I think we're going to all of a sudden realize it will be more about outcomes, and it will be more about customization, and it will be more about alignment. And not just about time horizons, because that's something we can all sort of battle against.

But here's what I would say is I still look at time horizons and you look at investing. We're investing in underlining companies. It's like investing in underlining people. And when you have good culture, why is good culture so important? It's because you actually believe in people and that they're going to get it done. But they're not going to get it done overnight, usually in a good way. And I think the same thing holds true when we want to have companies do great things, Leo Strine's stakeholder world. It isn't just maximizing profits in a short period of time.

And you just take that to an investor level, and I think we should really be honest with ourselves and say, that's called trading and speculation. It really is. I don't have time to really invest in that company. That's where moving capital is something that we do a lot more of versus investing and realizing that it takes time to get things done well. And sustainability is a perfect example of that.

Josh Barton
Carol, there's a question in here around quant investing, and I think what we've seen, certainly locally, but I know around the world is, you know, I guess an outcome of this sort of benchmark orientation is that a way to handle that is to become more benchmark oriented, which quant strategies do quite well, as opposed to fundamental, where you're going to get more of a ride from a performance perspective. Thoughts on that?

Carol Geremia
Yeah, I think that's a great point. See, here's where I think we should say we came out with Blended Research for exactly the point when we would say on many of our products, we're benchmark agnostic. That's not how some of our teams are managing these portfolios. Today, that's a horrible answer, right? Because somebody says, what do you mean you're not benchmark aware? But we were benchmark agnostic as investors. Long-term investors with our average holding of a stock like eight to nine years, because of a risk management approach for longevity.

On the other hand, many clients said, “you know what, I have to be benchmark aware. I have to be relative aware.” So quant has been such a great solution for understanding the tension of the investor demand to be able to get that, to get somewhat, and we don't like saying necessarily the best of both worlds, but the tension of responding to being benchmark aware in quant, I think has been a great development in the industry. But here's what we do. We pit it against agnostic concentrated portfolios or passive. We make it all. Instead, I think this is where total portfolio customization, and many of you already are doing, is actually measuring them differently for the role that they play versus the role against each other. And I think that's where there's going to be huge innovation and opportunity because the other side of the allocation of capital in the system is where all the systemic risk is growing. And so that's that's where we've got it.

Audience Member
Don't get me wrong, I'm 200% behind your big picture here, but I'm just wondering whether shareholders are being sold short by, I think it was Leo Strine's suggestion, that it's a choice between shareholder focus or stakeholder focus. And you have to be focused on stakeholders to worry about customers, suppliers and the community. And I think it's selling shareholders short by characterizing the choice as shareholders only care about short-term profit and shareholders don't care about those other three things. And I think you're unnecessarily making people suspicious of the message by suggesting that companies should be focusing on something other than the people that own the company.

Carol Geremia
Yeah, thank you. To be honest with you, I did not like that language up there under shareholder primacy. I could not agree with you more. And I actually thought the theory of Milton Freeman's, I called Leo Strine after I read his paper. And I said, “I loved it, but I think you're wrong. I actually think Milton Freeman's theory is still actually right, that if companies are focused on profitability, long-term profitability, like so many are, then there is everybody wins.” The problem is I do think time horizons to get that, it has played out where that is almost impossible to do.

And I think I would challenge the fact that if you're a public company today, you're not fighting for financing like you used to when Milton Freeman wrote this thing. You get financing no matter what, because you're in a benchmark. And I'll use the example of Tesla. Tesla was added to the S&P 500 in 2020. It was the seventh largest company in the world at that time, but it was added to the S&P. It had already gone up 784%. But here's the other part of it. Within 30 days, the markets had to buy $80 to $90 billion of Tesla stock not due to fundamentals, just to get it fit, appropriately weighted in the benchmark.

So these are underlining things that I think are tension points. I don't have the answer. It's more that we should just be looking at them to realize we've got some distorted unintended consequences coming here that's going to affect returns long term.

Josh Barton
Hey, we're out of time. So thank you, Carol.

 

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